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Abstract: The purpose of  this study is to investigate whether abnormal accrual mispricing acknowl-
edged in accounting literature is a manifestation of documented value-glamour anomaly in finance litera-
ture. This study proposes the traditional value-glamour proxies (sales growth, book-to-market, earning-
price, cash flows-price, and size) and CFO/P ratio (ratio of operating cash flows and stock price) to
explain the mispricing of  abnormal accruals.
Using a sample of  540 firm-year observations of  companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE)
from the period of  1993 to 2003, the study finds that individually, only either the E/P or CFO/P ratio
can pick up the mispricing attributed to abnormal accruals. These results can be interpreted as follows: (1)
as captured by E/P ratio, abnormal accrual mispricing is due to the market’s inability to understand
managers’ attempts to manage reported earnings; (2) as captured by the CFO/P, the market is unable to
assess the persistence of  cash flows.
From a practical standpoint, this study has simplified the research agenda related to asset pricing. The
result suggests that a researcher can control for the abnormal accrual mispricing and the value-glamour
anomaly parsimoniously via just one variable, E/P ratio.
Abstrak: Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menyelidiki apakah mispricing akrual tidak normal yang
dikenal dalam literatur akuntansi merupakan manifestasi dari anomali saham value-glamour  yang
didokumentasikan dalam literatur keuangan.  Penelitian ini menggunakan proksi tradisional untuk saham
value-glamour (pertumbuhan penjualan, rasio nilai buku dan nilai pasar, rasio earning-price, cash flows-price,
dan ukuran perusahaan) dan CFO/P (ratio operating cashflows dan harga saham) untuk menjelaskan
mispricing dari akrual tidak normal.
Dengan menggunakan 540 obseravasi (perusahaan-tahun) dari perusahaan yang terdaftar di Jakarta Stock
Exchange (JSE) dari perioda 1993 sampai dengan 2003, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa hanya salah satu
dari variabel E/P atau CFO/P yang dapat menjelaskan mispricing yang berasal dari akrual tidak normal.
Hasil penelitian ini dapat diinterpretasikan sebagai berikut: (1) seperti yang dapat dijelaskan oleh variabel
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E/P, mispricing akrual tidak normal disebabkan oleh ketidakmampuan pasar dalam mengerti laporan laba
yang dibuat oleh manager; (2) seperti yang dapat dijelaskan oleh variabel CFO/P, pasar tidak dapat
menangkap persistensi dari cash flows.
Aplikasi praktis dari hasil penelitian ini adalah penyederhanaan agenda penelitian yang terkait dengan penilaian
aset. Hasil penelitian ini merekomendasikan bahwa peneliti dapat mengontrol secara parsimoni mispricing
akrual tidak normal dan anomali saham value-glamour dengan menggunakan hanya satu variabel yakni rasio
E/P.
Keywords: business performance; entrepreneurial orientation; environmental uncertainty
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Introduction
Despite somewhat strong evidence that
the stock market is efficient, there have been
scores of studies that have documented long-
term historical anomalies in the stock mar-
ket. Anomalies, by their nature, represent a
challenge to existing theory, and have been
motivating many researchers to find plausible
explanations. Hence, investigating the inci-
dence and generalisability of anomalies will
provide additional insight into the nature of
this challenge to capital market efficiency.
This study investigates two well known phe-
nomena, namely value-glamour anomaly and
abnormal accrual mispricing, found in finance
and accounting literature, respectively, using
data from the Indonesian capital market.
In finance literature, value-glamour
stocks anomaly is the most publicized
anomaly and is frequently touted as the best
strategy for investing (Graham and Dodd
1934; De Bondt and Thaler 1985, 1987; Sum-
mers 1986; Chan 1988; Conrad and Kaul
1988; Fama and French 1988a, 1988b; Jaffe
et al. 1989; Fuller et al. 1993; and Kupiec
1993). Value (glamour) stock is defined as a
stock with high (low) ratios of fundamentals
to price. The ratios include book-to-market
(B/M), earning-to-price (E/P), and cash flow-
to-price (C/P). There is a large body of evi-
dence documenting the fact that historically,
value stocks are outperformed glamour
stocks, and this phenomenon is robust to rep-
lication. Numerous studies employing data
from non U.S. capital markets have come to
similar conclusions regarding glamour and
value stocks (Capaul et al. 1993; Sanders
1995; Chisolm 1991; and Keppler 1991).
Similar results also document using data from
the Indonesian capital market (Susiyanto
1997; Warninda and Asri 1997; Sartono 2000;
and Wahyuningsih 2000).
The explanations among researchers
regarding the value-glamour anomaly are di-
vided into three different schemes. Firstly,
Lakonishok et al. (1994) attribute the phe-
nomenon to investors’ error in expectations.
They argue that investors overreact, in par-
ticular, investors are excessively pessimistic
(optimistic) about value (glamour) stocks. In-
vestors have lower (higher) expectations of
future growth due to weak (strong) past per-
formance of  value (glamour) stocks. Secondly,
another scheme of explanation is that value
stocks are outperformed glamour stocks be-
cause the former is riskier (Fama and French
1992, 1993, 1996). Thirdly, methodological
problems with the measurement of  long-term
abnormal returns create an illusion of  infe-
rior returns to glamour stocks (Fama 1998;
Kothari, Sabino, and Zach 1999). This study
is intended to provide insight by employing
this anomaly to explain the mispricing of ab-
normal accruals documented in accounting
literature.
Based on the accounting literature, ac-
counting earnings can be disaggregated into
two components that are accruals and cash
flow from operation (CFO). Accruals and
CFO should have different implication on one
year ahead earnings expectations, or stated
differently, they have different persistence.
The accruals component should be less per-
sistent than the CFO component. However,
Sloan (1996) documents that a market fails
to appreciate fully the lower persistence of
the accrual component of  earnings and, con-
sequently, overprices total accruals. Using
quarterly data, Collins and Hribar (2000) also
find that the market overprices total accru-
als. Neither Sloan (1996) nor Collins and
Hribar (2000) investigate whether the over-
pricing is due to abnormal accruals (discre-
tionary accruals), normal accruals (non dis-
cretionary accruals), or both. Xie (2001) finds
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that the market overestimates the persistence
of  abnormal accruals, and consequently over-
prices these accruals. This result is consis-
tent with DeFond’s and Park’s (2001) find-
ing that the market overprices abnormal ac-
cruals because investors under-anticipate the
future reversal of  these accruals. The reported
evidence of all these studies implies that the
market mispricing of  abnormal accruals is
due to its inability to correctly assess the per-
sistence of  abnormal accruals. Pincus et al.
(2005) provide international evidence about
abnormal accruals mispricing employing a
sample of 20 countries including Indonesia.
They find that the accrual mispricing is more
likely to occur in countries with a common
law legal tradition where extensive use of
accrual accounting is permitted and the
strength of shareholder protection is weak.
In sum, one of the available explana-
tions of both value-glamour anomaly and ab-
normal accruals phenomena is related to
mispricing patterns. The reasons to expect
that the two mispricing patterns capture the
similar phenomenon are as follows: firstly, dis-
cretionary accruals as a component of  total
accruals are related to forecasted growth
(Beaver 2002; and McNichols 2000); secondly,
Decow et al. (1998) document that firms with
high sales growth have large positive accru-
als (glamour stocks) while firms with low
sales growth have negative accruals (value
stocks); thirdly, both phenomena are associ-
ated with reversal of  prior returns; fourthly,
future abnormal returns related to value-glam-
our anomalies are concentrated surrounding
subsequent earnings announcement (LaPorta
et al. 1997; Sloan 1996).
Desai et al. (2004) find a new variable,
namely CFO/P, operating cash flows mea-
sured as earnings adjusted for depreciation
and working capital accruals scaled by price,
captures mispricing attributed to the tradi-
tional value-glamour proxies (past sales
growth, B/M, E/P, and C/P) and accruals.
This finding suggests that the CFO/P vari-
able can be considered an expanded value-
glamour proxy. The CFO/P in Desai’s et al.
(2004) study can pick up the accrual
mispricing. This result is also consistent with
Beavers’s (2002) conjecture that the accru-
als anomaly is the glamour stock phenomenon
in disguise.
The purpose of this study is to provide
empirical evidence from the Indonesian capi-
tal market regarding the value-growth
anomaly previously described, whether the
anomaly is a manifestation of the mispricing
of  abnormal accruals. There has been no
study investigating whether the accrual phe-
nomenon is a manifestation of the value-
glamour stocks anomaly in the Indonesian
capital market. This study is important be-
cause, firstly, it contributes an important piece
to the puzzle surrounding the two related
anomalies; secondly, it discovers a variable that
subsumes abnormal returns related to both
accruals and the traditional value-glamour
proxies as found in Desai et al. (2004); thirdly,
it facilitates a further investigation about what
exactly the market misprices – accounting
manipulation through accruals, or cash flow
information, or expectations about future
growth. To find out why the accruals and
value-growth stock anomalies occur will con-
tribute to the literature on the connection
between institutional and corporate gover-
nance structures and the uses of  accounting
information in equity market.
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Related Studies and
Hypotheses Development
Anomalies and Market Efficiency
Anomalies are empirical results that
seem inconsistent with maintained theories
of  asset pricing behavior. They indicate ei-
ther market inefficiency (profit opportunities)
or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pric-
ing model. Finance and accounting literature
pays a great deal of attention to the efficiency
of  capital markets. Research in this area most
commonly examines market anomalies, which
are defined simply as predictable abnormal
returns (Ball 1992).
At the fundamental level, anomalies can
only be defined relative to a model of nor-
mal return behavior. Fama (1970) notes this
fact early on, pointing out that tests of mar-
ket efficiency also jointly test a maintained
hypothesis about equilibrium expected re-
turns. Thus, whenever someone concludes
that a finding seems to indicate market inef-
ficiency, it may also be evidence that the un-
derlying asset pricing model is inadequate.
However, it is also important to con-
sider the economic relevance of a presumed
anomaly that will be addressed in this study.
Jensen (1978) stressed the importance of
trading profitability in assessing market effi-
ciency. In particular, if  anomalous return be-
havior is not definitive enough for an effi-
cient trader to make money trading on it, then
it is not economically significant. This defi-
nition of market efficiency directly reflects
the practical relevance of academic research
into return behavior.
Value-Glamour Anomaly
The value-glamour phenomenon refers
to the empirical regularity that value socks
are outperformed glamour stocks. Value
(glamour) stocks are identified with the low
(high) past sales growth, high (low) B/M, E/
P, and C/P. A trading strategy employing
these ratios, commonly called a contrarian
strategy, results in economically significant
abnormal return.
In an influential paper, Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) atribute the su-
perior (inferior) performance of  value (glam-
our) stocks to errors in expectations on the
part of investors about future growth pros-
pects of  these firms. Lakonishok et al.(1994)
posit and find that value stocks are under-
priced because investors appear to extrapo-
late poor past growth rates into the future and,
hence, are pessimistic about such stocks. On
the other hand, investors are overly optimis-
tic about glamour stocks and have higher ex-
pectations of future growth because these
firms have strong earnings and growth in the
past. As growth rates mean-revert in the fu-
ture, investors are positively (negatively) sur-
prised by the performance of  value (glam-
our) stocks. Numerous studies of  foreign
stock markets have come to similar conclu-
sions regarding glamour-value stocks anomaly
(Capaul et al. 1993; Sanders 1995; Chisolm
1991; and Keppler 1991). Similar results are
also documented using data from the Indo-
nesian capital market (Susiyanto 1997;
Warnin and Asri 1997; Sar tono 2000;
Wahyuningsih 2000).
Accordingly, the hypothesis related to
value-glamour stocks can be stated as follows:
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H
1
: Performance of value stocks characterized by
the firms with low past sales growth, high B/
M, high E/P, high C/P, high CFO/P, and
big size are outperformed that of glamour stocks
characterized by the firms with high past sales
growth, low B/M, low E/P, low C/P, low
CFO/P, and small size.
 Abnormal Accrual Mispricing
Sloan (1996) demonstrates that a trad-
ing strategy based on long (short) position in
stocks that are in the lowest (highest) decile
of  accruals generate significant abnormal re-
turns in the following year. Sloan’s results are
anomalous to capital market efficiency, and
the anomaly appears to stem from the inabil-
ity of investors to recognize differences in
persistence between the accruals and oper-
ating cash flow components of  earnings. That
is, investors implicitly assign a higher weight
to accruals in pricing stocks ignoring that
accruals mean-revert more rapidly than op-
erating cash flows.
Subramanyam (1996) demonstrates that
the overpricing of  total accruals that Sloan
(1996) documented is due largely to abnor-
mal accruals. Hong Xie (2001), in his study
also finds the mispricing of  abnormal accru-
als. The results are robust to five alternative
measures of  abnormal accruals, and still hold
when he estimates abnormal accruals after
controlling for major unusual but largely
nondiscretionary accruals. This finding is con-
sistent with the notion that the market over-
prices the portion of  abnormal accruals stem-
ming from managerial discretion.
A number of studies have shown that
the accrual phenomenon is robust across vari-
ous samples of  U.S. firms (Collins and Hribar
2000; Bradshaw et al. 2001; Zach 2002).
Similarly, Pincus et al. (2005) provide inter-
national evidence about the accruals phe-
nomenon employing sample of 20 countries
including Indonesia.
Accordingly, the hypothesis related to
abnormal accrual mispricing in which earn-
ings expectations in stock prices overweight
the lower persistence of  the accrual compo-
nent of earnings, can be stated as follows:
H
2
: Performance of stocks characterized by the firms
with low abnormal accruals are outperformed
by that of stocks characterized by the firms with
high abnormal accruals.
The Use of  Value-Glamour
Proxies to Explain the Abnormal
Accrual Mispricing
As described previously, the anomaly of
value-glamour stocks occurs because inves-
tors extrapolate past growth in sales, earn-
ings, and cash flow, and realize subsequently,
mostly at the time of future earnings an-
nouncements (La Porta et al. 1997), that such
growth is not sustainable due to the mean
reverting of  growth rates. Similarly, the ac-
crual phenomenon occurs because investors
extrapolate past earnings into the future and
are surprised when earnings announced sub-
sequently are lower or higher than expected
due to accruals reversals. Thus, both phe-
nomena relate to errors in expectations about
future fundamentals, in turn, there must be a
certain proxy that can link the two corre-
sponding phenomena.
This study examines whether the abnor-
mal accrual phenomenon is an aspect of  the
value-glamour anomaly documented world-
wide in the finance literature (Fama and
French 1998). Desai et al. (2004) show that
the accrual phenomenon and the value-
growth anomaly are captured by abnormal
returns to a new variable, CFO/P, in the USA.
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Accordingly, this study hypothesize as
follows:
H
3
:  Abnormal accrual mispricing phenomenon is
subsumed in the value-glamour anomaly.
Methodology
Data
Financial data and capital market data
are collected for all firms listed on the Jakarta
Stock Exchange from financial report data-
base of Jakarta Stock Exchange and PDPM
database of Accounting Development Cen-
ter of Universitas Gadjah Mada. The period
of coverage is 1990-2004.
All firms with available data are included
in the sample. Following Lakonishok et al.
(1994) financial firms, such as banks and in-
surance companies, are excluded because of
peculiarities in the accruals for such firms.
Firms with negative book values and earn-
ings are also eliminated because B/M and E/
P for such firms do not lend themselves to
intuitive interpretation as a growth proxy.
Variable Definitions
The following are variables used to
proxy value-glamour stocks:
- SG (past sales growth) measured as the
average of annual growth in sales over the
previous three years.
- B/M measured as the ratio of the fiscal
year-end-book value of equity to the mar-
ket value of  equity.
- E/P measured as earnings after tax scaled
by the market value of  equity.
- C/P measured as earnings after tax plus
depreciation scaled by market value of
equity.
The following are variables used to
measure total accruals (TACC):
TACC = (DCA-DCash)-( DCL-DSTD)-
Dep
where:
Working Capital Accruals =
(DCA-DCash)-( DCL-DSTD)
- DCA: change in current assets
- DCash: change in cash/cash equivalent
- DCL: change in current liabilities
- DSTD: change in short term debt included
in current liabilities
- Dep: depreciation
CFO/P is measured as cash flow from
operation scaled by the market value of  equity,
where:
CFO= Earnings + Depreciation -
Working Capital Accruals
The analysis focuses on comparing the
abnormal returns due to accruals and the tra-
ditional value-glamour proxies. The abnormal
returns are computed after forming portfo-
lios based on the four traditional variables of
value-glamour stocks and one variable of ac-
cruals. Each firm is ranked and assigned into
quintiles based on each variable used to iden-
tify value-glamour stocks and accruals. An-
nual raw buy-and-hold returns and size-ad-
justed returns for each firm are calculated for
each of the one year after portfolios are
formed. At the end of  each year, the portfo-
lio is rebalanced. The annual size-adjusted
return for a firm is the difference between
the annual buy-and-hold return for the firm
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and the average annual buy-and-hold return
of the size quintiles portfolio to which the
firm belongs.
The Jones model is used to estimate
normal accruals and abnormal accruals:
TACC
t
/TA
t-1
 = 
1
[1/TA
t-1
] +

2
[REV
t
/TA
t-1
] +

3
[PPE
t
/TA
t-1
] + e
t
where:
TA
t-1
: beginning of year total assets
DREV
t
: change in revenues
PPE
t
: gross property, plant, and equipment
e
t
: abnormal accruals (ABACC), while
the predicted values are normal ac-
cruals (NACC)
Statistical Model and Hypothesis
Testing
To facilitate the test of  Hypothesis 1,
2, and 3 the following tests are conducted:
Basic hedge test
A basic hedge test is used to observe
mean differences of portfolios’ returns in the
extreme (the lowest and the highest) quintile.
A simple T-test procedure is used to measure
the significance of the difference. H
1
 is sup-
ported when:
- Portfolios in the lowest quintile of  sales
growth should be significantly outper-
formed by those of  in the highest quintile.
- Portfolios in the highest quintile of  B/M,
E/P, C/P, CFO/P, SIZE should be sig-
nificantly outperformed by those of  in the
lowest quintile.
H2 is supported when:
Portfolios in the lowest quintile of  abnor-
mal accruals (ABACC) should be signifi-
cantly outperformed those in the highest
quintile.
Regression approach
The regression approach used to test H
1
,
H
2
, and H
3
 follows Fama’s and MacBeth’s
(1973) model. Portfolios are formed using the
same procedure described above to determine
quintile ranks. The scaled rank for each vari-
able is computed for each year by annually
ranking the corresponding variable value into
quintile (0 to 4) and dividing the quintile by
4 such that each observation related to the
corresponding variable takes a value ranging
between 0 to 1.
The regression models are stated as fol-
lows:
Model I:
SAR
1
 =
1
 + 
2
SGqu int + 
3
BMqu int +

4
EPqu int + 
3
CPqu int +

6
CFOPqu int + 
7
SIZEqu int +
e
t+1
Model II:
SAR
1
 =
1
 + 
2
ABACC + 
3
NACC + e
Model III:
SAR
1
 = 
1
 + 
2
ABACC + 
3
NACC +

2
SGqu int + 
3
BMqu int +

4
EPqu int + 
3
CPqu int +

6
CFOPqu int + 
7
SIZEqu int + e
t+1
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where SAR
t+1
 is annual size-adjusted abnor-
mal return of  each firm, one year after port-
folios formation. SGquint, BMquint, EPquint, CPquint,
CFOquint, and SIZEquint relate to scaled-quintile
ranks (ranging from 0 to 1) of  accruals, past
sales growth, book-to-market, earning-to-
price, cash flows to price, operating cash
flows to price, and size portfolios, respec-
tively. The coefficients on SGquint, BMquint,
EPquint, CPquint, CFOquint, and SIZEquint represents
adjusted abnormal return to a zero-invest-
ment portfolio optimally formed to exploit
the information in the corresponding variable.
To test the H
1
, the expected signs of
coefficient of each variable in Model I are as
follows:
- SGquint is negative and significant, following
the effect of  value-glamour anomaly.
- BMquint is positive and significant, following
the effect of  value-glamour anomaly.
- EPquint is positive and significant, following
the effect of  value-glamour anomaly.
- CPquint is positive and significant, following
the effect of  value-glamour anomaly.
- SIZEquint is positive and significant
To test the H
2
, the expected signs of
coefficient of each variable in Model II are
as follows:
- ABACC is negative and significant, follow-
ing the effect of  mispricing abnormal ac-
crual.
- NACC is not significant.
To test the H
3
, the expected sign of
ABACC coefficient is not significant after
controlling with value-glamour proxies, as
shown in Model III.
Empirical Analysis
Summary Statistics of  the Data
Table 1 provides a summary statistics
of  variables of  interest across firm-year ob-
servations. There are 540 firms within an 11
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
SG 0.30 0.43 -0.44 6.70
BM 1.11 1.01 0 9.21
EP 0.19 0.60 0 13.04
CP 0.78 1.30 0 17.47
CFOP 0.34 1.23 -4.96 8.21
LNSIZE 12.34 1.79 7.51 17.4
TACC/TA
t-1
-0.15 2.23 -13.76 47.59
ABACC/ TA
t-1
-0.24 0.88 -6.92 5.17
NACC/ TA
t-1
0.09 2.03 -11.61 42.42
R1 -0.10 0.52 -1.0 2.33
SAR1 -0.03 0.40 -1.23 1.22
N= 540
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year period (1993-2003). Panel A of  Table 1
shows the descriptive statistics of each vari-
able. The means of  accruals (TACC/TA
t-1
and ABACC/TA
t-1
) are negative (-0.15 and -
0.24, respectively) across firm-year observa-
tions suggesting that depreciation dominates
other working capital accruals.
The mean, minimum, and maximum of
B/M and E/P ratios are positive because
some firm-year observations are excluded,
especially during the crisis period (1998-
2000), due to negative book values and earn-
ings, respectively. Before excluding the nega-
tive book values and earnings, there are 735
firm-year observations. After excluding the
negative ones, there are 565 firm-year obser-
vations. This study ends up with 540 firm-
year observations after removing outliers.
The minimum and maximum of all
value-glamour proxies are more than three
times the standard deviations. However, the
relative wide range in value-glamour variables
does not affect the result due to the use of
quintiles rank as opposed to actual values.
The correlation matrix in Panel B shows
the Spearman and Pearson correlations
among the variables of interest. Using the
Spearman correlation matrix, TACC/TA
t-1
 has
a high negative correlation of –0.552 with
CFO/P ratio. C/P and CFO/P ratios also
have a high positive correlation of 0.596.
This correlation is in line with the way the
ratios are computed. The C/P ratio has a high
positive correlation with the B/M and E/P
ratios, while LNSIZE has a negative correla-
tion with B/M and C/P ratios. The Pearson
correlation matrix shows similar results.
Results of  Basic Hedge Tests
The basic hedge test reports returns to
an unconditional value-glamour stocks and
accruals strategy. Employing basic hedge
strategy means taking a long position on port-
folios that will generate higher future returns
(RET
t+1
), and a short position on portfolios
that will generate a lower future returns. This
strategy will result in a positive future returns.
The portfolios in the extreme quintiles
(quintile 1 and 5) meet this requirement. Table
2 reports raw returns (RET
1
) and size adjusted
returns (SAR
1
) for each of the following year
after portfolio formation. The returns are buy-
and-hold returns for 12 months after portfo-
lio formation (month +1 to +12).
Panels A to F of  Table 2 replicate the
strategy using the value-glamour proxies, such
as SG, B/M, E/P, C/F, CFO/P, and LNSIZE.
Value (growth) stocks are identified by firms
in the lowest (highest) quintile of  B/M, E/P,
C/P, CFO/P, and LNSIZE. Value (glamour)
stocks generate higher (lower) returns (R1)
and size-adjusted returns (SAR
1
). SG strat-
egy has a reversed direction. Except for
LNSIZE strategy, the directions of  one-year
future returns and size-adjusted returns of SG,
B/M, E/P, C/P, and CFO/P strategies, as
shown in column 7 of  Table 2, are consistent
with the usual value-glamour strategy. How-
ever, the magnitudes of the return differences
are not statistically significant. The reason is
due to short periods of  year observations
which is only 11 years data available to form
portfolios.
Panel G to I of  Table 2 reports the one
year return and size adjusted return to the
accrual strategy. Only strategy using normal
accruals (NACC/TA
t-1
) can earn positive re-
turns and abnormal returns. The lowest ac-
cruals quintile earns a return of  -5.4 percent
in the post formation year while top quintile
of  accruals earns an average return of  –15.6
percent. Using size adjusted returns, the firms
in the bottom quintile of  accruals earn a re-
turn of 0.9 percent and those in the top
quintile earn an abnormal return of  –9.8 per-
Ekawati
88
cent. Consistent with Sloan (1996), returns
associated with the extreme low-accruals
portfolios are higher while those related to
the extreme high accruals portfolio are lower.
Even though the directions of the results are
consistent but they are not statistically sig-
nificant. As in value-glamour strategy, the
same reason lends support to these explana-
tions.
The results of the basic hedge test are
only able to confirm the directions of  the re-
turns of  value-glamour and accruals strate-
gies stated in H
1
 and H
2
. However, the mag-
nitudes of the return differences are not sta-
tistically supported.
Table 2. Returns and Size Adjusted Returns to Various Portfolios
Panel A: Sales Growth (SG) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
SG 0.023 0.159 0.244 0.329 0.725 -0.702 0.000
R1 -0.138 -0.080 -0.070 -0.080 -0.123 -0.015 1.000
SAR1 -0.956 -0.004 -0.017 -0.009 -0.041 -0.054 0.863
Panel B: Book-to-Market Ratio (BM) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
BM 0.263 0.586 0.911 1.397 2.328 2.065 0.000
R1 -0.217 -0.109 -0.085 -0.021 -0.066 0.110 0.271
SAR1 -0.130 -0.030 -0.006 0.016 -0.020 0.152 0.197
Panel C: Earning-to-Price Ratio (EP) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
EP 0.030 0.071 0.111 0.183 0.522 0.492 0.000
R1 -0.241 -0.164 -0.107 -0.022 0.039 0.280 0.001
SAR1 -0.197 -0.093 -0.013 0.044 0.090 0.287 0.000
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel D: Cashflow-to-Price Ratio (CP) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
CP 0.118 0.278 0.484 0.846 2.077 1.960 0.000
R1 -0.198 -0.158 -0.068 -0.053 -0.020 0.178 0.085
SAR1 -0.131 -0.071 0.040 -0.022 0.014 0.145 0.066
Panel E: Cashflow of  Operation-to-Price Ratio (CFOP) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
CFOP -0.626 -0.005 0.192 0.513 1.593 2.219 0.000
R1 -0.133 -0.157 -0.095 -0.061 -0.038 0.095 0.666
SAR1 -0.098 -0.089 -0.018 0.003 0.033 0.132 0.121
Panel F: Size (LNSIZE) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
LNSIZE 10.102 11.237 12.148 13.032 15.007 4.905 0.000
R1 0.040 -0.065 -0.135 -0.206 -0.118 -0.157 0.166
SAR1 -0.006 0.004 -0.047 -0.070 -0.045 -0.038 0.959
Panel G: Total Accruals (TACC/ TA
t-1
) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
TACC -0.962 -0.260 -0.151 -0.061 0.624 -1.586 0.000
R1 -0.081 -0.065 -0.140 -0.048 -0.156 0.074 0.833
SAR1 -0.023 -0.008 -0.088 0.008 -0.054 -0.014 0.999
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Table 2 (Continued)
Panel H: Abnormal Accruals (ABACC/ TA
t-1
) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
ABACC -0.330 -0.033 -0.211 -0.241 -0.373 0.0433 0.996
R1 -0.096 -0.142 -0.023 -0.122 -0.106 0.010 1.000
SAR1 -0.067 -0.047 0.027 -0.079 0.003 -0.069 0.722
Panel I: Normal Accruals (NACC/ TA
t-1
) Portfolio
Value Quintile Glamour
1 2 3 4 5 1-5 P-value
NACC 0.102 0.354 0.033 0.049 -0.092 0.194 0.955
R1 -0.054 -0.075 -0.076 -0.125 -0.156 0.102 0.588
SAR1 0.009 0.001 -0.039 -0.033 -0.098 0.107 0.287
Regression Results
Table 3 reports the regression coeffi-
cient of each variable of value-glamour prox-
ies. The results indicate that, individually,
each value glamour proxy, except for SG and
LNSIZE, can explain the variation on one-
year future abnormal returns (SAR1) across
firms. Putting all value-glamour proxies in one
regression model, the study shows that E/P
ratio is the only variable that can explain the
variation of  one-year future abnormal return.
Individually, E/P, C/P, CFO/P ratios
have a strong positive relation with SAR1,
the relations are statistically significant at 1
percent alpha level with the regression coef-
ficients of 0.284, 0.133, and 0.142, respec-
tively. B/M has a positive relation with SAR1,
and the relation is statistically significant at
5 percent alpha level with regression coeffi-
cient of 0.106.  The multiple regression em-
ploying all value-glamour proxies results in
just one variable, E/P, that has a positive re-
lation and significance at the 1 percent alpha
level with SAR1 with regression coefficient
of 0.300. This result indicates that E/P ratio
is able to pick up the value-glamour proxies
represented by SG, B/M, C/P, CFO/P, and
LNSIZE ratios in the regression model. Thus,
as stated in H1 that performance of  value
stocks characterized by the firms with high
B/M, high E/P, high C/P, high CFO/P are
outperformed that of  glamour stocks char-
acterized by the firms with low B/M, low E/
P, low C/P, and low CFO/P, respectively, is
supported. Additionally, E/P ratio subsumes
the anomaly represented by the other value-
glamour proxies.
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Table 4 shows that the regression coef-
ficient of  total accruals, abnormal accrual,
and normal accrual (TACC/TAt-1, ABACC/
TAt-1, and NACC/TAt-1) on one-year fu-
ture abnormal return (SAR1). Only abnormal
accrual variable has a negative and signifi-
cant relation with SAR1. The regression co-
efficient is -0.039 and significance at 5 per-
cent alpha level. This result supports the H2
that the higher (lower) the accruals the lower
(the higher) the one-year future abnormal re-
turns. Thus, this study presents empirical evi-
dence of  abnormal accrual mispricing.
Table 5 shows the regression of  one-
year abnormal return (SAR
1
) on value glam-
our proxies and accruals. The results indicate
that, individually, value glamour proxies rep-
resented by E/P and CFO/P only that can
pick up the abnormal accrual mispricing on
one-year future returns across firms. Thus,
abnormal accrual mispricing phenomenon is
subsumed in the value-glamour anomaly (that
can be represented by E/P and CFO/P) as
stated in H3 is supported.
Putting all the abnormal accrual, nor-
mal accrual, and value-glamour proxies in one
regression model, the study shows that E/P
ratio is the only variable that can explain the
variation of one-year future return. The re-
gression coefficient of E/P ratio is 0.294 and
statistically significant at the alpha level of 1
percent.  This result indicates that E/P ratio
is not only able to pick up the abnormal ac-
crual mispricing, but also value-glamour prox-
ies represented by SG, B/M, C/P, CFO/P ra-
tios, and LNSIZE in the regression model.
Thus, this study presents a simple variable
of  E/P ratio that can control the accrual
Table 4. Regression of  One-Year-Ahead Abnormal Return on Accruals
Intercept TACC/ TA
t-1
ABACC/ TA
t-1
NACC/ TA
t-1
Coefficient -0.033* 0.001
t-statistic (-1.874) -0.105
Coefficient -0.042** -0.039**
t-statistic (-2.344) (-1.984)
Coefficient -0.043** 0.007
t-statistic (-1.923) -0.886
Coefficient -0.043** -0.039** 0.008
t-statistic (-2.384) (-1.999) -0.922
Notes: ***, **, * refer to significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, two-tailed, respectively. The sample (540
firm-year observations) comprises of  all manufacturing firms listed on Jakarta Stock Exchange
from 1993-2003.
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mispricing and value-glamour anomaly in In-
donesia stock market. This result is similar
to Desai’s at al. (2004) study that presents a
new variable of CFO/P to control the two
phenomena in the US stock market.
Conclusions
This study investigates whether ac-
counting accrual anomaly acknowledged in
accounting literature is a manifestation of
documented value-glamour anomaly in fi-
nance literature. To accomplish this purpose,
the study firstly confirms the existence of
value-glamour and accruals anomalies using
a sample of  540 firm-year observations of
companies listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange
(JSE) from the periods of 1993 to 2003.
The results of this study show that, in-
dividually, B/M, E/P, C/P, and CFO/P ra-
tios can be used as value-glamour proxies in
the Indonesian capital market. Related to
accrual phenomena, only abnormal accrual
produces the mispricing phenomenon. Indi-
vidually, only either the E/P or CFO/P ratio
can pick up the mispricing attributed to ab-
normal accruals. These results can be inter-
preted as follows: (1) as captured by the E/P
ratio, abnormal accrual mispricing is due to
the market’s inability to understand manag-
ers’ attempts to manage reported earnings; (2)
as captured by the CFO/P, the market is un-
able to assess the persistence of  cash flows.
From a practical standpoint, this study has
simplified the research agenda related to as-
set pricing. The result suggests that a re-
searcher can control for the abnormal accrual
mispricing and the value-glamour anomaly
parsimoniously via just one variable, the E/
P ratio. It follows the rationale that investors
in the Indonesian capital market use the E/P
ratio as the main valuation method to deter-
mine the buy-hold investment strategy in
capital market.
The study does not investigate further
the underlying cause of  the E/P anomaly. It
is possible that the underlying causes of the
two phenomena, namely abnormal accrual
mispricing and value-glamour, may be differ-
ent but can be captured with the same vari-
able, namely, the E/P ratio. It is worth not-
ing that there is no consensus in finance lit-
erature about the causes of the value-glam-
our anomaly itself. These remaining open
questions are the limitations of this study that
are left for future research.
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